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Abstract
This paper reviews Yamazaki’s (2006) rhetorical study of Japan’s official apologies for its wrong 
doings during World War II and for its colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula from the first apology to 
South Korea in 1965 to Maruyama’s apology in 1995. This review reveals the evolution of Japan’s 
apologies from the earliest apologies in the 60s and 70s, the comfort women apologies and the apologies 
and anti-apologies of the 90s. Comparisons to Germany’s apologies for wartime wrongdoings reveal 
important similarities and differences that show the dangers of making simple comparisons. It is 
concluded that Japan’s apologies to South Korea, China and the international community have failed 
for six basic reasons. It also concludes that Yamazaki’s apology model is essential for the analysis of 
national apologies since it allows for the analysis of representation, sincerity and audience, three 
elements that are missing from either the four-part Lazare or the five-part linguistic models to which 
it is compared.
1. INTRODUCTION
It will soon be seventy-five years since the end of the Pacific War, yet there are many who feel that 
Japan, as a nation, has still failed to apologize or to apologize sufficiently, and that it has failed to show 
genuine repentance for its wars of aggression, atrocities and violations of basic human rights (Tolbert, 
2017; Dahlstrom, 2015; & Dujarric, 2013). Moreover, there are wide perception gaps between countries. 
According to the Pew Research Center, 98% of South Koreans and 78% of Chinese believe that Japan 
has not sufficiently apologized, whereas only 28% of the Japanese agreed (Chun, 2015; Drake, 2013).
This paper is an attempt to better understand the reasons for this gap. The author reviews Jane 
Yamazaki’s (2006) rhetorical study of Japan’s apologies for historical wrongs during World War II and 
the colonial period to better grasp the history and issues concerning Japan’s apologies and to examine 
Yamazaki’s apology analysis framework for use in future research into Japan’s wartime apologies. Of 
particular interest is how Yamazaki’s framework compares to Lazare’s (2004; Mosher, 2016 & 2017) 
four-part process for apologies, and with a widely accepted five-part linguistic model (Ishihara & 
Cohen, 2010; Shimizu, 2009; Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper, 1989; University of Minnesota, 2015; 
Reviewed in Mosher, 2017).
Lazare (2004) states that at its most basic, an apology is a two-part encounter, in which the 
offender, takes responsibility for an offense, and expresses regret for his/her action to the aggrieved 
party. His four-part apology process is as follows: (1) acknowledgment of the offense; (2) 
communication of remorse and related attitudes; (3) explanations; and (4) reparations.
In the five-part linguistic model cited above, apologies can be made by using one or more of the 
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following routinized strategies: (1) an expression of apology; (2) an acknowledgement of 
responsibility; (3) an explanation or account; (4) an offer of repair; and, (5) a promise of 
nonrecurrence.
Yamazaki’s (2006) book on Japanese wartime apologies begins with the earliest apology in June of 
1965 to South Korea and continues up to Prime Minister Maruyama’s seminal apology on August 15, 
1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. The apologies covered are mostly to South 
Korea and China, but are increasing given with an international audience in mind. This paper consists 
of the following sections: Yamazaki’s apology model; main accusations against Japan; early apologies 
from 1965-1990; comfort women apologies; apologies and anti-apologies of the mid-1990s, a 
comparison with Germany’s wartime apologies, and; conclusion.
2. YAMAZAKI?S APOLOGY MODEL
Yamazaki develops an analytical model for apologies based on concepts drawn from speech act and 
rhetorical theory and modified to accommodate nation-state apologies. First, following Tavuchis 
(1991), she states that an apology at minimum must contain an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of 
the violated rule, an admission of wrong-doing and responsibility, as well as some expression of regret 
or remorse for the harm that has been done. Furthermore, she states national apologies like individual 
apologizes exist on a continuum from minimal to ideal, such as insincere, incomplete, partial and full. 
Yamazaki’s five basic areas of apology analysis are: (1) naming the offense; (2) indicating regret; (3) 
representation; (4) sincerity; and (5) receptivity of the audience. The first two categories relate to the 
linguistic content of the apology. The third category has special significance for collective, nation-state 
apologies. Namely, who is qualified to speak for the nation? The final two categories are vital 
contextual components outside of the apology performance itself. For an apology to be taken as 
sincere, accompanying actions or statements of the government must not contradict the apology’s 
content. The fifth category refers to the degree to which apology recipients accept an apology or not.
2.1 Naming the Offense
Naming the offense is the first requirement of an apology. In interpersonal apologies, this may be 
somewhat indirect since it can be assumed that all parties know what the wrong doing was. However, 
for nation-states, the naming provides an official record that may require greater clarity and 
specificity. The choice of words can also indicate the degree of seriousness of the offense, such as an 
error, the causing of pain or sorrow, or a crime. Finding the most satisfactory wording often requires 
negotiation and compromise.
2.2 Expression of Regret
Expressions of regret are not as simple as just saying “I’m sorry,” or “I apologize,” or their 
equivalents, since an apologizer may say they are sorry, but refuse to apologize because they have 
done nothing wrong. So, despite the use of the word sorry, this is merely a statement of regret and not 
an apology. The reverse is also possible. The accused may “apologize” and admit they are wrong, but 
insist they would do the same thing again because it was for a just cause, or because it was fun. True 
apologizes, then, must both take responsibility for the wrongdoing and express sincere regret.
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In addition, for historical apologies, since the apologizer is most often not the wrongdoer, it is 
important the emotional and performative dimensions of the apology be convincing.1 When German 
Chancellor Willy Brant fell to his knees in Warsaw in December 1970 to apologize for Nazi war crimes, 
for example, it provided a potent and enduring image of heartfelt contrition.
2.3 Representation
For nation-state apologies the issue of representation is also of key importance. Who has the right to 
apologize for the nation? In the case of Japan, is it the Emperor, the Prime Minister or the Diet? Does 
the representative have the support of the people? How much consensus is necessary, and how should 
it be communicated? What is a suitable occasion or “stage” for the apology? Should it be public, 
formal, informal and so on.
2.4 Sincerity
For individuals, Yamazaki (2006) says, “sincerity can be defined as the congruency between 
‘inward’ thoughts and outward expression (p. 20).” However, for nation-states, the definition is not as 
straight forward since the apologizer is apologizing for something others have done in the past, and 
determining sincerity requires the researcher to read minds or search for hidden motives.
Consequently, Yamazaki defines sincerity for national apologies as the consistency and consensus 
that is visible in public records. First, government officials must avoid any actions or statements that 
seem to contradict previous official apologies. Compensation that backs up the words of the apology 
may also be essential. Second, there must be “institutional consistency.” Examples of the later are 
consistency in government approved textbooks, the constitution, and citizenship rules.
2.5 Audience
Apologies are made to an offended other who must accept the apology, in order for it to be 
successful. In the case of national apologies, the audience is complex. In addition to the people directly 
offended, there are multiple publics, remote audiences, and national and international media which 
become involved in voicing acceptance or rejection of any given apology.
3. MAIN ACCUSATIONS
There are two levels of accusations against Japan: (1) specific wartime atrocities, and aggression, 
and (2) colonial rule in Asia. Unfortunately, the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal failed to address all 
aspects of the war. There was according to Yamazaki (2006), for example, “complete inattention to 
crimes/actions taken against Koreans who had been colonial subjects (p. 25).” One reason may be that 
four of the eleven allied countries that participated in the Tribunal (i.e., the UK, the United States, 
France and the Netherlands) were also colonial powers. Consequently, the Japanese public and 
government were left with many unresolved wartime issues.2
Moreover, new accusations have immerged over time and accusers have become more organized and 
international. In the 1990s, the issue of military comfort women became a major issue due to the 
revelation of official documents that proved there was official military involvement in the 
establishment and management of comfort stations, leading to the establishment of internationally 
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active special interest groups and legal suits against Japan. At the same time, PoW groups in Western 
countries and Chinese and American academic groups pressured Japan regarding the Nanking 
Massacre/Incident. In 1997, for example, the US House of Representatives officially demanded 
apologizes and reparations for Nanking, the Bataan Death March, comfort women3 and PoWs.
Accusations have also been somewhat selective and overstated. For example, biological 
experimentations on prisoners and atrocities committed in the Rape of Manila have been largely 
overlooked. Information has sometimes been sketchy and the claims have been exaggerated, resulting 
in the polarization of accusers and accused. Moreover, for the two Koreas and China, Japan is the 
enemy whose defeat is closely linked to their national and political identities (c.f., Lee, 2019). However, 
not all Asian countries believe Japan should continue to apologize. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Burma, Indonesia and Taiwan have all accepted Japan’s apologies.
Unlike Germany, it has been much harder to identify who is guilty of wartime crimes. In Germany, it 
was the Nazi Party and Nazi officials, with whom there was a clear postwar break. In Japan, however, 
there was no clear break. Emperor Hirohito, who may seem to be the most likely person to blame, was 
removed from any responsibility by American authorities.
In 1996, the United Nations called for those who were involved in the sex slavery of comfort stations 
to be identified and punished. This is a new demand. But, Yamazaki (2006) asks, should old soldiers 
who visited comfort stations be charged when they thought that the women were prostitutes and that 
they were doing nothing illegal?
Finally, Yamazaki concludes that although the details and interpretations of facts may be contested, 
there is a consensus regarding the basic facts of the colonial and wartime accusations.
4. THE EARLY APOLOGIES: 1965 to 1990
The early Japanese apologies are relationship apologies, according to Yamazaki (2006), since their 
primary motivation was the restoration of relationships with neighboring countries. They express a 
degree of apology and regret short of a full, explicit apology. The first apology4 was given at the 
signing ceremony normalizing Japan and South Korean relations in 1965. In it, Japanese Foreign 
Minister Shiina expressed “true regret (makoto ni ikan)” and “deep remorse (fukaku hansei)” for an 
“unfortunate period in our countries’... history” (Yamazaki, p. 34). The words “remorse (hansei),” 
“regret (ikan)” and “unfortunate past” formed a basic vocabulary for the apologies to follow.
In 1972, there was a slightly more explicit apology to China in a joint written communique that 
established the basis for restoration of relations with Japan. Additionally, Emperor Hirohito made very 
brief statements to the Americans in 1975 and 1978 which expressed regret for an unfortunate past.
In the mid-1980s, as Cold War tensions began to ease, there was a growing realization, on all sides, of 
the importance of Asian relationships, and of the need for Japan to balance its over-dependence on the 
United States. A controversy over the wording of Japanese history textbooks that erupted in the 
summer of 1982 added a sense of urgency for the need to apologize. In short, according to Yamazaki, 
the controversy centered on incorrect media reports that the Japanese Ministry of Education had 
ordered the replacement of the word “invade (shinryaku suru)” with the less negative word “advance 
(susumu).” In fact, the government had only suggested the use of a milder tone. Still, the controversy 
revived a sense of distrust and suspicion of Japan’s motives.
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At the request of the South Korean government, Emperor Hirohito was the first to apologize on the 
occasion of the visit of President Chun Doo Hwan, on September 6, 1984, the first postwar visit of a 
Korean head of state. At the time, the Koreans thought the emperor was the best representative for 
the apology since the annexation and colonialization of the Korean peninsula had been carried out in his 
name. The Emperor’s statement was given at an official dinner party at the Imperial Palace. It begins 
with an introduction highlighting the many centuries of cooperation and exchange between the Korean 
and Japanese peoples, and then states:
Notwithstanding that relationship, there was a brief period in this century an unfortunate 
past between our two countries. This is truly regrettable; and it will not be repeated again. 
(Yamazaki 2006, p. 36)
This statement names the offense and expresses regrets for past actions, and thus fulfills the minimal 
requirements for an apology. However, the naming of the offense is vague and nonspecific. It does not 
establish a clear record of the basic details of who, when, where and what actually occurred that was 
wrong: a serious problem for an official apology. The use of the passive masks who exactly regrets the 
past. However, the expression of forbearance (“will not be repeated again”), and even sometime in the 
last century represent an advance in clarity to the Emperor’s statement to Chinese Vice Premier Deng 
Xiao Ping in 1978 when he simply said, “At one time, there were unfortunate events (Ibid, p. 37).” To 
place things in context, it should be noted that ambiguity and lofty expressions are typical of imperial 
statements in general.
On May 24, 1990, Emperor Akihito apologized to South Korean President Roh Tae Woo at an official 
welcoming banquet similar to that of his father’s. After stressing the close relations of the two 
countries over the centuries, he repeats his father’s apology and adds words of his own.
... I am reminded of the words of the Showa emperor [Hirohito] that “There was a brief period 
in this century an unfortunate past between our two countries. This is truly regrettable and it 
will not happen again.” When I think about the sufferings of the people in your country 
caused by our country in this unfortunate period, I cannot help but feel intense sorrow 
(tsuuseki). (Ibid, p. 39)
Like his father’s apology six years earlier, Akihito does not explicitly name Japan’s wrongdoing. He 
does more clearly state that the suffering was “caused by our country”; namely, Japan. By using the 
personal pronoun “I” (watakushi), he personalizes the expression of regret. The key apology word of 
intense sorrow (tsuuseki) is also much stronger than his father’s words though some protested at the 
time that a true apology would have words such as shazai, owabi or sumimasen.
Prime Minister Kaifu also apologized to President Roh on May 24th and 25th of 1990.
During a period in the past, the people of the Korean peninsula experienced unbearable grief 
and suffering because of the actions of our country. (We) are humbly remorseful (kenkyo ni 
hansei) and wish to note our frank feelings of apology (owabi). (Ibid, p.42)
The biggest change is the use of a more explicit word of apology (owabi). In terms of the actions 
apologized for, Prime Minister Kaifu was only slightly more explicit than Emperor Akihito. He referred 
to actions (koui) of Japan, but did not name them. Most notably, he even failed to refer to Japan’s 
colonial rule of Korea, which he had promised to do.
Another thing that differentiates Kaifu’s apology is that it is part of a dialog with Roh rather than a 
speech or press conference statement. Following his words of apology above, he says Japan and Korea 
need to cooperate with world organizations, but to build on their new relationship, they must first 
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seriously address the unfortunate past. The later was a clear reference to the need to establish a fund 
for Atomic bomb victims living in Korea, and to repatriate Koreans in Sakhalin to South Korea, actions 
that Japan did follow through on.
Although, improved relations were still a primary motivation for apologizing, the relationship was 
not seen as merely bilateral, but rather a multilateral relationship focused on rebuilding mutually 
beneficial economic relations in a new post-Cold War environment. The talks went so well that 
Yamazaki characterizes the two leaders as “singing a duet.” At the final press conference, Roh and 
Kaifu declared that bilateral historical problems had been solved, and there was no further need for 
Japan to apologize.
However, the Korean public did not agree. According to the Korean press, there were two problems 
with Emperor Akihito and of Prime Minister Kaifu’s apologies. First, the expressions of regret were too 
weak and should have included words, such as shazai (apology), or sumimasen (sorry) rather than the 
more ambiguous tsuuseki (deep regret). Second, there was insufficient specificity in the description of 
wrongdoing to convince the public that Japan (its government and people) were truly sorry, and what 
exactly they were sorry for.
Maintaining face for both parties proved too difficult. The Koreans needed to have their sufferings 
both in the war and as a colony validated and atoned for. But, the Japanese needed to be able to admit 
historical wrongdoings without recounting past atrocities and human rights violations in starkly 
explicit and humiliating detail. Thus, the Japanese desire to save face resulted in relatively weak 
apologies that provided insufficient evidence of contrition. Although Japan did take the concrete 
actions noted above to demonstrate sincerity, the appearance of a reluctance to apologize, and a lack of 
consensus among Japanese, left room for doubt at a time of rising nationalism in South Korea.
5. THE COMFORT WOMEN APOLOGIES
On December 6, 1991, thirty-five South Koreans, including former so-called comfort women, filed 
suit against the Japanese government demanding an apology. Although the Japanese government had 
up to this point denied any government or military involvement in what they said were privately 
operated brothels, just days later, according to Yamazaki (p. 58), Japanese researcher Yoshimi 
Yoshiaki uncovered Japanese Defense Agency records that proved the official nature of wartime 
prostitution.
This created a crisis situation for the Japanese government that required a fundamentally different 
type of apology in two ways. First, the government was no longer just apologizing for past wrongs. 
Now, they had to respond to a law suit and charges of a cover up in the present, requiring crisis 
apologies that addressed both past and present wrongs. Second, the comfort women apologies needed 
to address a new sense of morality. Although in the past, crimes against women were ignored as too 
embarrassing or even considered normal in times of war, public awareness and attitudes had changed. 
This required a transcendent apology that admitted to moral failings and allowed for the reestablishing 
of moral credibility.
Beginning in January of 1992, Japanese government officials including Prime Minister Miyazawa 
issued several apologies. On January 11, Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi publicly acknowledged the 
Japanese military had been involved in the operation of comfort stations. On January 13, he released an 
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official cabinet memorandum. Typical of crisis apologies it began with expressions of sympathy for the 
victims and ended with a promise of an investigation. The memorandum includes the following 
apology:
When we consider the suffering experienced by the so-called comfort women of the Korean 
peninsula, it is heartbreaking (mune ga tsumaru).... The Japanese government has expressed 
deep regret and apologies before concerning past acts of Japan that have caused unbearable 
suffering for the people of the Korean peninsula, but in this case, we want to again express 
our sincere apology and regret to those who endured suffering beyond description (hitsuzetsu 
ni tsukahigatai). The Japanese government is resolved that this should never happen again. 
(Yamazaki, 2006, p. 59)
Secretary Kato repeats many of Prime Minister Kaifu’s words: “remorse,” “apology” and “unbearable 
suffering.” But, he also adds new more emotive language of “suffering beyond description” and 
“heartbreaking.” The memorandum does not mention compensation, however, and Kato repeats the 
official position that this was settled by the 1965 normalization treaty with South Korea.
On January 17th, Prime Minister Miyazawa issued an apology as part of a major policy address to the 
South Korean legislature. In addition to repeating key words from Prime Minister Kaifu’s apology (i.e., 
“unbearable suffering,” “owabi” and “hansei”), he explicitly names Japan as the victimizer and Korea 
as the victim. This goes considerably beyond earlier references to the “unfortunate past.” Another new 
element is his promise to educate the Japanese public regarding the “errors” of the past. Also, unique 
to this apology was that it was not the Korean government that was demanding an apology, but 
outraged citizens in Japan, South Korea and the international community. In fact, until this point, the 
Korean government had shown little interest in the issue (See also Lee, 2019).
However, Miyazawa’s apology was rejected by the Korean Council, the main special interest group 
representing Korean comfort women. It was rejected as deceitful and insincere on two grounds. First, 
they said, sincere apologies must contain a full and detailed disclosure of the crimes and human rights 
violations committed. And second, there must be compensation for the victims.
In 1995, the Japanese government established the Asian Women’s Fund to provide funds to former 
comfort women and appealed to the Japanese public for funds. It admitted wrongdoing and even 
acknowledged the recruitment of teenage girls and the limits of apologies alone to heal the emotional 
and physical wounds inflicted. By July 1996, the government promised to give any comfort woman, 
who could support her claim, ¥20 million and a letter of apology from Prime Minister Hashimoto. 
Although the fund itself was private, the government agreed to pay for medical expenses and other 
fund expenses.
The Korean Council, however, advised comfort women to refuse both the compensation and apology, 
insisting that payments come directly from the government as compensation for crimes against 
humanity.5 Specifically, they wanted the government to take responsibility for a criminal policy that 
included the abduction and rape of young girls. Yamazaki concludes that they wanted punishment and 
not reconciliation. A simply apology was not going to be sufficient.
The comfort women apologies are the strongest of Japan’s apologies in terms of the explicit 
recognition of wrong doing. When faced with documentation, the government condemned the 
wrongdoing in unequivocal terms. However, perceptions of grudging admissions of wrongdoing and the 
failure of the government itself to compensate victims, have cast a lingering shadow over future 
apologies. Clearly, the goal posts had moved. The comfort women issue had become part of a bigger 
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international movement in the struggle against women’s oppression.
6. APOLOGIES AND ANTI-APOLOGIES
6.1 The Hosokawa Apologies
In August of 1993, the political environment for apologies changed dramatically. The conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had lost its majority for the first time since 1955, and Prime Minister 
Hosokawa Morihiro formed the first non-LDP government in almost four decades. His coalition 
government consisted of eight minority parties and included members of the left-wing Socialist Party 
and other left of center parties. Apologies became more attractive for the new government which 
wished to distance itself from previous LDP governments.
Over the course of his brief nine-month tenure, Hosokawa made at least four apologies that more 
explicitly named Japan’s offenses, expanded the audience for apologies and included leftist politicians 
for the first time. He moved the apology discourse along in several key ways. In his first press 
conference on August 10th he said, “My own personal understanding is that it was an aggressive war 
(shinryaku sensou) and a mistaken war (machigatta sensou) (Yamazaki, 2006, p. 148).” In a Diet speech, 
he bowed to conservative pressure by using the weaker expression of “acts of aggression,” but he 
broke ground by apologizing for Japan’s colonial rule, something that the United Kingdom, France, and 
the United States have resisted doing. In a visit to South Korea, he not only apologized for colonial rule, 
but made explicit reference to details of Japan’s history of occupation. Also, in referring to the victims 
of war, he was the first to explicitly include non-Japanese.
Second, by including the Japan Socialist Party, he paved the way for the development of a more 
consensual view of the war which served to strengthen future official apologies as well. For the first 
time, the Socialists participated in the official end of war commemoration on August 15, a ceremony 
they had boycotted in protest of previous conservative governments’ attitudes that admission that the 
war was unjust would deny the validity of those who sacrificed their lives for Japan. In 1993, when the 
Speaker of the House, Doi Takako, gave a speech at this ceremony, she was very explicit in describing 
the horrors of war, and in admitting to Japan’s wrongdoings.
Third, the Hosokawa administration was a “new” government for which apologies were a convenient 
tool for showing a clear break from the policies of the “old” Japan; i.e., the LDP governments of the 
past 37 years. It was also a convenient way to help build a coalition with the Socialists. However, 
Hosokawa failed to maintain consensus with more conservative politicians, causing a backlash that 
brought his government to an early end.
6.2 Conservative Apologia
By 1994, according to Yamazaki (2006), it seemed Japan was on the way to making a full 
acknowledgement and settlement of outstanding wartime issues. However, three things prevented 
that. First, increasing international attention was given to the comfort women issue, resulting in more 
lawsuits and bad publicity. Second, there was a backlash to apologies among Japanese conservative 
groups and politicians that saw explicit recognition of Japan’s wrongdoings as demeaning and 
derogatory. Third, high-level government officials made a series of statements that contradicted the 
basic premise of previous official apologies; namely, revisionist views of history that stressed positive 
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aspects of the war and avoided responsibility for wrongdoing.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Yamazaki documents “anti-apology” statements of several high-
ranking conservative politicians that undermined the government’s official apologies. In rhetoric, these 
statements are clear examples of defensive apologia strategies that deny wrongdoing; minimize the 
offense; explain, excuse or rationalize; justify offenses as being for a greater purpose, and counter 
attack.
In July 1986, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki stated his interpretation of Japanese wartime 
history in an interview as follows:
War means killing people; world history is a history of aggression and war. The erroneous 
view that only Japan committed aggression must be corrected.... The verdict that [General] 
Tojo was a A-class war criminal was wrong. The assimilation of Korea in 1910 [into the 
Japanese Empire] had been by perfectly proper joint agreement between the representatives 
of the then states. (Yamazaki, 2006: 91)
Fujio’s statements make three defensive anti-apologetic assertions. First, he minimizes the wrongness 
of Japan’s actions by challenging the term aggression. He is saying this is not aggression, and every 
country does it; thereby, impling that the international criticism of Japan is unfair; i.e., he 
counterattacks the accuser. Second, he denies that General Tojo was an A-class war criminal by 
renaming the offense: he is a military leader, not a criminal. The implication is, of course, that the 
Tokyo war crime trial was biased and unfair. Thus, he minimizes the offense by questioning the 
terminology. Third, he uses a legalistic argument to defend Japan’s annexation and colonization of the 
Korean peninsula. He defends this action by a technicality while conveniently ignoring the fact the 
agreement was made under the coercive presence of Japan’s military forces.
In sum, Yamazaki concludes, Fujio’s brief statement uses four classic apologia strategies designed to 
defend against charges of wrongdoing: (1) minimization, (2) redefinition of terms, (3) differentiation 
from similar wrongdoing, and (4) questioning the motives of the accuser.
In 1987, Okuno Seisuke, the Minister of Lands, defended Japan’s aggressive military actions in Asia 
using the apologia strategy of claiming a higher purpose. His stated, “Japan is the only country with 
the resolve to resist the colonization of Asia by the white races, so should not be accused of aggressive 
intent (Yamazaki, 2006: 92).” In other words, he is saying we had good intentions, so any wrongdoing 
should be judged in that light. Since the war did result in the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia, 
his argument carries weight among Japan’s conservatives.
Several other high-profile Japanese politicians followed with more anti-apology statements. In 1990, 
Ishihara Shintaro, a former LDP Diet member and mayor of Tokyo, claimed that the Nanking 
Massacre was a fabrication (detchiage). In May 1994, Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto said the term 
massacre was too strong. He argued it should be called a “war crime” or “atrocity” instead, and the war 
should not be termed an aggression since the intent was to liberate Asia. In August 1994, the Director-
General of the Environmental Agency, echoed Nagano, saying the term aggression was wrong since 
there was no aggressive intent, and Asian countries gained their independence thanks to Japan.
Although Ishihara Shintaro retracted his statement, and all of the other conservative politicians 
were forced to resign, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru himself used another apologia strategy. When 
asked at a press conference in 1989 if he agreed the Asia-Pacific War was a war of aggression, he said, 
“History’s judgment is a problem for future historians (Yamazaki 2006: 93).” This is a form of denial; 
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namely, “delay and avoidance.” When challenged, however, he admitted that the “aggressive nature of 
the war cannot be denied (p. 93).” Yamazaki says this type of confrontation avoidance strategy is 
particularly common among Japanese.
Despite the fact that many politicians took responsibility for their statements by resigning, the 
cumulative effect created the impression that Japan was reluctant to admit wrongdoing and give a true 
apology, and the Diet resolution of 1995 only served to strengthen that impression. Maruyama 
Tomiichi, the prime minister, made it a condition of his coalition government that the Diet pass a 
resolution apologizing for the war. Since he believed the resolution should be unanimous, much time 
and effort was given to consulting everyone on the wording. After considerable wrangling in public 
and private, the Diet passed a short three paragraph resolution on June 9, 1995. The second paragraph, 
quoted in full below, is the heart of the statement and comes closest to an apology.
Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern 
history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting 
pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this 
House express a sense of deep remorse. (Yamazaki, 2006: 94)
The expression “a deep sense of remorse” is used, but the word apology (owabi) used by Prime 
Ministers Kaifu, Miyazawa and Hosokawa, or any close equivalent, is avoided. Colonial rule and acts of 
aggression are admitted, but in the context of modern history in which there have been many instances 
of colonialism and acts of aggression. And, Japan’s wrongdoing is minimized by placing it in the larger 
context of international wrongdoing.
The Diet resolution represented the culmination of the conservative backlash against the official 
government apologies, which had become increasingly explicit and unequivocal. The anti-apologizes 
created a counter-discourse that created the impression of an unrepentant Japan that has never 
(truly) apologized (c.f., Chun, 2015; Drake, 2013; Renee, 2011). It is commonsense that you cannot 
apologize and deny wrongdoing at the same time; yet, that is the effect of the clash between official 
apologies and the defensive apologia.
As President Roh stated in his reply to Emperor Akihito’s apology in 1990, “The past cannot be 
forgotten or erased, but [by means of] correct historical understanding/awareness”—that is by 
recalling the past as it was, and by “testifying” to and for the past—we can “wash away the past” 
(Yamazaki, 2006: 96). Roh is saying that apology has magical and paradoxical quality: you can best 
defend yourself by not defending yourself. To realize this magical potential to change “reality,” the 
apologizer must resist the temptation to explain, justify, deny or minimalize the wrongdoing. 
Interestingly, this is something German politicians on both the right and left avoided doing.
Why do nations refuse to apologize then? Yamazaki (2006) says there are two types of objection: (1) 
rejection of the validity of the accusation; (2) opposition to apology even when the wrongdoing is 
accepted as true. For type one, people and countries may apologize even when unconvinced of the 
validity of the accusations to maintain harmonious relations. However, for nation-states, the 
recognition of wrongdoing becomes an official recognition of guilt which sets precedents and can 
damage reputations for years to come.
Yamazaki gives three reasons for the second type of resistance: (1) concern for political legitimacy; 
(2) respect for one’s predecessors; (3) fear of litigation and compensation. First, admitting to serious 
past wrongs can damage a country’s political legitimacy. There are servile implications of the accused 
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lowering themselves to their righteous victims. Second, Confucian ideas of respect for one’s ancestors 
make it hard for a country like Japan to apologize. The Bereaved Families Association of Japan insisted 
throughout the apology debates that apologies dishonor the sacrifices and memory of soldiers who 
gave their lives for Japan. Such resistance is not peculiar to Japan, however. American veterans’ 
groups, for instance, expressed similar sentiments when opposing the Enola Gay exhibit at the 
Smithsonian Museum. Finally, apologies can be taken as evidence of legal guilt for groups seeking 
monetary compensation. Governments, she states, may be rightfully concerned about creating a non-
ending demand for compensation.6  Japan, for its part, insists that all compensation issues were settled 
at the Tokyo War Crimes trial.
6.3 Maruyama Apology
Prime Minister Maruyama Tomiichi’s apology on August 15, 1995 the 50th anniversary of the end of 
World War II was well received, and may be the most successful of all of Japan’s postwar apologies 
according to Yamazaki. Indeed, even today it is considered to be the official Japanese apology. One 
thing that distinguished it from past apologies was that it was aimed at an international audience and 
received very significant international media coverage.
Just a few months before, on June 10th, Maruyama had failed to obtained a strong Diet resolution, 
and in July the Korean Council had condemned the Asian Women’s Fund as inadequate. Consequently, 
he saw August 15th as a good chance to salvage the situation. Moreover, there had been no direct calls 
for an apology as in the past, so this was a chance to make an unsolicited apology.
He made the apology on the morning of August 15 at a press conference at his home before 
attending the official ceremony honoring Japan’s war veterans. Here are excerpts of his ten-minute 
statement.
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, 
advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and 
through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the 
people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such 
mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of 
history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse (tuusetsu na hansei) and 
state my heartfelt apology (kokoro kara no owabi). (Yamazaki, 2006: 103)
This begins, Yamazaki explains, with the same vague and indirect language many have criticized 
before. “During a certain period in the not too distant past,” a “mistaken national policy,” “advance 
along the path to war,” and “ensnare the Japanese people.” These phrases do not make an 
unambiguous admission of wrong doing, nor is there any mention of the comfort women or PoWs. 
There is no detailed account of war atrocities or wrongdoing. But, then we do hear the words “colonial 
rule and aggression.” Maruyama uses the stronger term of aggression and not the more ambiguous 
“acts of aggression.” The phrase “irrefutable facts of history” signals a clear rejection of historical 
revisionism. And, for words of regret, he used owabi (apology) as well as the often used hansei 
(remorse).
In the next part of his statement, Maruyama directs his message to the domestic audience and asks 
the Japanese people to reflect on the lessons of the last fifty years.
We tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace.... [We must] convey to younger 
generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors of our history.... Now, upon 
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this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, we should bear in mind that we 
must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray 
from the path to peace and prosperity of human society in the future.... Building from our 
deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must 
eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible 
member of the international community and thereby, advance the principles of peace and 
democracy. (Yamazaki, 2006:105, 155-156)
Maruyama, Yamazaki says, justifies the need to apologize by focusing on internal issues of history, 
political identity and the future mission of the nation. In saying, we need to “ensure that we do not 
stray from the path of peace and prosperity of human society,” he is also promising his international 
audience to not engage in military adventurism or wars of aggression again. Further reassurance to 
the world is his assertion that Japan must eliminate “self-righteous nationalism” and work to achieve 
“peace and democracy.”
A particular strength of Maruyama’s apology is the way he synthesizes the words and feelings of 
both sides of Japan’s apology debate. First, he combines apology and self-criticism with praise for the 
Japanese people who rebuilt Japan as a peaceful and prosperous democratic nation. Second, he 
expresses his “feelings of profound mourning” for both victims “at home and abroad” before 
referencing the atomic bombings and vowing to work for disarmament and non-proliferation, and thus 
contribute to world peace.
The final sentence of his statement clarifies his appeals to multiple domestic and international 
audiences. He states, “It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone/pay for (tsugunai) its 
past and lay to rest the spirits (mitama) of those who perished” (Yamazaki 2006: 107). The idea of 
atoning for the past appeals both to leftists in Japan and those in other countries who were the victims 
of Japan’s aggression. The reference to laying to rest the spirits of those who perished refers to both 
Japanese war veterans on the right, who are honored at this ceremony, and to victims of the atomic 
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (a nod to pacifist and popular sentiment).
In addition, although the words he uses do not differ so much from the words used by Prime Minister 
Hosokawa, his style, emotional tone and ethos differ. In the opening, he states, “Now, when I remember 
the many people at home and abroad who fell victim to the war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of 
emotions (Yamazaki, 206: 107).” This combined with “heartfelt apology” resulted in the repetition of 
“Heartfelt Apology” in global headlines. Also, his years of work as a socialist politician and social 
justice activist gave him more credibility than previous prime ministers.
In general, Maruyama’s apology was well received around the world. One major news outlet said, 
“finally an apology”. Another stated, Maruyama ends five decades of collective amnesia. Although 
these responses show unawareness or non-acceptance of past apologies, they also demonstrate the 
effectiveness of his apology. Some, however, felt that his speech was more of a private gesture than an 
official apology since he gave it at his home and not at the official ceremony. Moreover, in the 
afternoon of the very same day, more than half of Maruyama’s cabinet visited Yasukuni Shrine to pray 
for the spirts of fallen soldiers (c.f, Koga, 2015).
7. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
National apologies which were relatively rare before World War II, increased dramatically in the 
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postwar period and especially in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. Yamazaki (2006) notes 
apologies by Sweden, the Vatican, the Soviet Union, the United States, and West and East Germany. 
These apologies have affected Japanese apologies both by providing models to emulate and against 
which to be judged. Yamazaki says the US apology to Japanese Americans in 1988 for their World War 
II interment, and the West German apologies have been the most influential. Here, the focus will be on 
the West German apologies.
German national apologies are often compared to Japanese apologies, and Japan usually comes out 
unfavorably. Some say Japan completely denies responsibility (Barkan, 2000 cited in Yamazaki, p. 
115). Chang (cited in Yamazaki, p. 115) states that although Germany has paid war reparations, 
apologized to its victims, and even sent leaders to the Warsaw Ghetto to apologize, we have seen no 
comparable actions from the Japanese government.
Yamazaki (2006) argues, however, that comparisons with Germany often fail to accurately grasp 
the similarities and differences between the two countries. Specifically, there are three problematic 
assumptions: (1) Germany has adequately apologized; (2) the apology situations are sufficiently 
similar to make direct comparisons; (3) audience evaluation and receptivity have been similar.
First, Germany’s record of apology has been criticized as well. Germans’ have at times focused 
mainly on themselves as the victims. They have debated competing views of the past and engaged in 
revisionism. Both countries have privileged their war veterans and families over foreign victims. Both 
have resisted a wholesale purge of wartime elites, and there are periodic controversies over “public 
memories” of the war.
Second, on the surface, the similarities seem sufficient for easy comparison. Both countries were 
defeated in World War II. Both faced similar economic, moral and political recovery challenges. Both 
had significant wartime actions to apologize and atone for. Both had promoted militarism and racial 
superiority, and their neighbors and the international community expected penance.
However, there are many significant differences that make simple comparisons problematic. In the 
early postwar years, Japan was totally dependent on the United States politically and economically and 
had to delay coming to terms with its neighbors, and due to the Cold War, Japan had no diplomatic 
relations with China or North Korea. Germany, on the other hand, had to rebuild relations with its 
European neighbors immediately in order to recover. Jewish victims had powerful advocates that 
Japan’s victims lacked. The nature of the allegations were also different. Germany was charged with 
genocide as well as aggression. In Germany, there was a complete and total change in governments and 
political parties, so governments were free to blame Hitler and the Nazi Party as the guilty parties. 
Whereas, in Japan, the ruling conservative party, the imperial system and the bureaucracy were 
largely a continuation of the prewar government. Thus, there was no clear, easy other to blame. One 
consequence, is that unlike Germany, the Japanese government is seen as responsible and deserving of 
blame by victims and their advocates.7
Thirdly, according to Yamazaki, the responsiveness to German and Japanese apologies has differed 
dramatically. In general, the state of Israel, the Jewish community and Germany’s European neighbors 
have willingly accepted German apologies and compensation. Whereas, the two Koreas and China have 
been much less receptive despite numerous official apologies and compensation efforts. A difference 
only partly explainable by Japan’s delayed apologies and differences in compensation payments.
Here, is a brief look at four of the German apologies examined in Yamazaki (2006). The first three 
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are made by West German chancellors in 1951, 1970 and 1985. The fourth is an official statement of 
remorse by the East German Parliament made in 1990. The first apology is given by Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer in September of 1951. Contrary to what might be expected, it includes no explicit apology 
statement, and it focuses on the suffering of the victims as opposed to German guilt. Moreover, it 
presents German reparations as an act of goodwill rather than an admission of guilt. It does, however, 
come fourteen years before the first Japanese apology.
The second apology was made by Chancellor Willy Brant in December of 1970 when he visited the 
Warsaw Ghetto and fell to his knees. It is actually a very strange apology, according to Yamazaki, since 
it lacks any words of apology, there was no prior official decision to offer an apology, and there was no 
clear recipient. Still the emotional impact of this gesture was very powerful and has been widely 
accepted as an indication of the true feelings of the German government and its people. The fact that 
Brandt spent his war years as a member of the anti-Nazi resistance in Norway also lent authenticity to 
his gesture. Interestingly, although Prime Ministers Kaifu, Maruyama and Hashimoto have attempted 
similar “gestures,” they have received little media attention.
The third apology was made by President Richard von Weiszaker in a speech to the German 
Bundestag on May 8, 1985, and like Prime Minister Maruyama’s apology is often referred to as the 
German apology. In contrast to Maruyama’s ten-minute press conference, Weizsacker’s speech was 
one hour in length. It lacks apology words such as “I/We apologize” nor explicit words of regret. 
Instead, he gives a detailed list of the victims: Jewish men, women and children; gypsies; political 
prisoners; mentally retarded; and even the women of the world, then explicitly refers to every 
conceivable wartime wrongdoing: rape and pillage, forced labor, forced sterilization and so on. His 
speech is a kind of elegy with the focus on remembering rather than on guilt. Although he addresses 
guilt, he rejects the collective guilt of the entire nation, but stresses that Germans’ are responsible. He 
seems to say that even though we ourselves did not commit the crimes, we take responsibility and 
accept the consequences.
Weiszacker’s apology presents an interesting shift in apologetic discourse, according to Yamazaki 
(2006). The focus is on the memory and commemoration of the victims. It is more about remembering 
the injustice and mistreatment of victims than promises of forbearance, and it emphasizes the healing 
and restoration of the victims over that of the perpetrator’s guilt. Renee (2011) and Rienzi (2015) also 
highlight this feature of German apologies.8
In 1990, on the occasion of German unification, the East German Parliament issued a formal apology 
for the “immeasurable suffering” caused by the Nazis during World War II including the “genocide” of 
Jews living Europe and the people of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Gypsy people. The statement 
acknowledged the “persecution” and “degradation” of Jews by communist East Germany after 1945, 
and finished with a declaration of willingness to “contribute” to the “healing of mental and physical 
sufferings” and pay “just compensation for material losses.” Again, the statement does not include 
words of apology, but it clearly implies a sense of apology by asking for forgiveness. Also, although this 
indirect apology was offered much later than Japanese apologies, it was a strong, official apology made 
by the post-communist parliament, and was well received.
Yamazaki (2006) concludes that German apologies indicate a clear acceptance of responsibility to 
make restitution for war crimes, and like Japanese apologies the expression of remorse and 
responsibility becomes more explicit over time. In contrast to Japanese apologies, however, there is 
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little emphasis on the aggression of war itself. But, both countries have been apologizing for different 
things. German apologizes focused on crimes against the Jews and other peoples; whereas, Japan’s 
focused more generally on a war of aggression and eventually on colonization. Germany decided to 
apologize and make reparations much earlier and of their own volition; whereas, most Japanese 
apologies came at the request of the accusers. Many comparisons exaggerate the differences in the 
degree of contrition displayed, and fail to appreciate the differences in apologia situations and the focus 
of the apologies.
8. CONCLUSIONS
When national apologies work, Yamazaki (2006) argues, they function to (1) repair relations with 
other countries, (2) facilitate the learning of history and the affirmation of basic moral principles, (3) 
provide historical records, and (4) heal victims’ trauma and grievances, and validate their identities. 
Sadly, she concludes that despite Japan’s many official apologies, there is a widespread view that Japan 
has not apologized for its wartime record, and thus has failed to some degree in each of the above 
apology functions.
Yamazaki’s examination of Japan’s apologies reveals several key reasons for this failure.9 First, 
Japan’s official apologies tend to name the offenses at a high level of generality. The two imperial 
apologies, for example, were notable for their use of genteel euphemisms, ambiguity and lofty 
expressions. This lack of detail and abstraction lessen the emotional appeal of the apologies.
Second, in the showing of regret, early Japanese apologies used the word hansei, translated as 
remorse or reflection. While this is central to Japanese notions of apology, it is a vague term that has 
gotten little respect in the international press (e.g., Kristof, 1998 cited in Yamazaki, 2006). It was not 
until the 1990s that the less ambiguous terms of owabi and shazai (apology) were used.
Third, is the problem of representation. In Japan, apologies have been made by emperors, prime 
ministers, foreign ministers, cabinet secretaries and official investigation representatives. But, there 
have been questions about the representativeness of these apologies as was noted even with the 
Maruyama apology. Most serious, though, is the lack of a strong official statement of apology from the 
Diet. This has particularly caused dissatisfaction with the comfort women apologies as Hicks 
summaries:
To this day the Diet has not issued an official apology to the former comfort women. The 
latter do not consider Emperor Akihito’s or Prime Minister Miyazawa’s apologies, issued in 
1990 [sic], official government apologies—statements that speak for the people of Japan. 
Rather, they are viewed as personal expressions of remorse, however deeply felt.... The 
governments of South Korea and North Korea do not see Japan as having issued an official 
apology to the former comfort women. (Hicks 1999, cited in Yamazaki 2006:131-132)
Fourth, is the question of sincerity. As Yamazaki states (2006, p. 132), “Sincerity requires the 
appearance of consistency and consensus in government statements, actions and institutions.” Japan’s 
dueling apology and anti-apology discourses have severely damaged the projection of sincerity.10 
Attempts at historical revisionism, such as secondary school history textbooks, repeated Yasukuni 
Shrine visits by prime ministers and cabinet members, and the insistence of the Japanese government 
of the finality of the reparations made at the time of the postwar treaty settlements have sent 
messages to the international community that undermine the message of official apologies.
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Fifth, the timing and pace of Japan’s apologies have been slow. The first Japanese apology was not 
until 1965, fourteen years after the first German apology. Regardless of the reasons for this delay, it 
feeds the narrative that Japan has been reluctant to apologize in sharp contrast with Germany. By the 
time Japan issued a series of stronger apologies in the 1990s, the expectations of the international 
community had risen (c.f., the comfort women apologies).
Sixth, for an apology to be successful the audience must accept it. The fact that Japan has been 
forced to offer repeated apologies for the same offenses shows a lack of acceptance and forgiveness. 
Repeated demands for apologies have caused apology fatigue (Chun, 2105) and backlash among 
Japanese conservatives.11 Moreover, the two Koreas and China have national identities rooted in 
liberation from the tyranny of Japan. For political reasons, it is convenient to treat Japan as the “bad 
guy.”12
This study reveals interesting differences between Yamazaki’s model for national apologies and the 
four-part process of Lazare (2004) and the five-part linguistic model. Lazare’s model includes 
“explanations” as the third part of his four-part model. Similarly, “an explanation or account” is the 
third strategy in the linguistic model (University of Minnesota, 2015). Yamazaki says repeatedly, 
however, that successful national apologies do not include explanations or justifications. Rather, she 
says, these strategies are features of anti-apologies. This researcher thinks, however, that closer 
analysis may reveal similarities between detailed accounting/naming of wrongdoings and sincere 
explanations that take responsibility rather than justify wrongdoing. Also, the linguistic model contains 
a promise of forbearance which is not in the Yamazaki model although it is in some of the national 
apologies reviewed here. Yamazaki’s model, which is based on both speech act and rhetorical theory, on 
the other hand, contains three parts not in either Lazare or the linguistic model which seem essential 
for the analysis of national apologies; namely, representation, sincerity and audience. As we have seen 
problems in any one of these three areas can determine the success or failure of national apologies.
This paper finishes with a few questions for future research. Why have some countries forgiven 
Japan whereas others’ have not? Is it due to differences in Japan’s apologies, or differences in the 
audience? Are audience differences related to differing views of history?13 Does the use of the word 
hansei (and accompanying non-verbal expresses of reflection/remorse) indicate differences in apology 
cultures? Can the failure of earlier Japanese apologies be seen as intercultural miscommunication? Has 
Japan’s apology culture changed? Can Saito’s (2015) cultural pragmatics framework facilitate 
understanding of Japan’s wartime apology failures? Are monetary reparations the only effective 
expression of sincerity? Can Japan’s overseas economic development projects also express sincerity?
Notes
1 See also Sato’s (2015) mise-en-scene (staging) element of political apologies.
2 For useful information regarding the settlement of wartime issues, treaties and reparations see 
History Issues Q&A (2019). Dahlstrom (2015) also has useful links to the “Tokyo Trials.”
3 The US House of Representatives passed a resolution in 2014 introduced by California 
Representative Mike Honda calling for Japan to apologize unequivocally for the wartime 
occupation and enslavement of women (Akaha, 2014).
4 Note: Japan apologized to Burma/Myanmar and to Australia in 1957 (List of Apology Statements, 
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2019).
5 According to Akaha (2014) the fund dispersed payments to 285 former comfort women in South 
Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines as of 2005.
6 Case in point, in August 2019 on the 80th anniversary of the start of WWII, Poland insisted that 
Germany still owes them compensation arguing that while the Jewish people have received 
compensation many Poles have received nothing (Easton, 2019).
7 The unofficial international tribunal for comfort women crimes held in Tokyo in 2000, for 
example, concluded that both the wartime and current Japanese governments were guilty 
(Yamazaki, 2006).
8 Renee (2011) argues apologies may be more detrimental that helpful for Japan and that it may be 
more productive to imitate Germany and stress the “practices of remembrance that do not fuel 
denial and glorification but that promote justice.”
9 Despite this, according to a Pew survey in 2015, Japan is viewed the most favorably of all nations 
in the Asia-Pacific region with a median 71% approval rate. In Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines 
and Australia more than 80% approve of Japan; whereas, the rate is only 25% in Korea and 12% in 
China.
10 Rienzi (2015) describes Japan’s apologies as akin to “islands in a sea of denial.” He also notes that 
Germany as of 2015 was still paying reparations to Israel. Japan, on the other hand, disbanded the 
Asian Women’s Fund in 2007 (History Issues, Q&A, 2018).
11 Also, see Renee (2011) regarding the contrition to backlash cycle of Japan’s apologies.
12 Lee (2019) provides an in-depth explanation of South Korea’s tribal mentality and political use of 
apologies as well as its own historical revisionism.
13 See Chun & Cho (2016) and Saito (2017).
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